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6Before launching into normative reflections on accountability in Chapter 3, 
this chapter develops a basic understanding of the central terms around which 
this book is structured and sketches the necessary background and context for 
locating the debate.
2.1 Partnerships
Nowadays, partnerships are everywhere. Visit the website of any major 
international institution, government, large corporation and – increasingly – 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) and you will most likely find some 
information about this organisation’s partnership programmes or philoso-
phy. Similarly, if you participate in a conference on governance issues or 
global public policy1 problems, the odds that ‘partnerships’ will be on the 
agenda are good.2
As mentioned in the Introduction, partnerships today address a wide 
range of issues. As a result, the term ‘partnership’ is nearly ubiquitous. It is 
used to describe many different and often contradictory phenomena.3 To 
be able to use the term in a social scientific context, this section defines its 
essential characteristics and distinguishes it from other concepts, namely 
networks and corporatism.
2.1.1 Definition
For the purposes of this book, ‘partnership’ is defined in an ideal typical 
way4 as a voluntary cooperative arrangement
between organisations from the public, private and/or civil society sec-
tors. The public sector includes public institutions at the local, regional, 
national and inter- or supranational level. The private sector includes 
small- and medium sized, as well as large and trans- or multinational 
companies. Civil society organisations can range from local, community-
based organisations to large, transnational development initiatives.
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that display a certain degree of institutionalisation. While partnerships 
are often dynamic in their composition and working methods and don’t 
need to follow a uniform or standardised institutional model, they must 
show a minimum of formality. This minimum includes a clear under-
standing of who the partners are, some regular form of consultation and 
agreed decision-making procedures.
that have common, non-hierarchical decision-making procedures and 
share risks and responsibilities. Different organisations cooperating on an 
equal footing and determining policies and action plans jointly is what 
transforms any working relationship into a partnership. Of course, that 
does not mean that partnerships know no power differentials between 
their partner organisations or that decision-making procedures cannot in 
any way reflect these differences. But for a cooperative relationship to be 
a partnership, all partner institutions have to be involved in a significant 
way in the taking of important decisions. This also implies that partner 
organisations share risks and responsibilities involved in the partnership.
whose purpose is to address a public policy issue. Partnerships are of 
interest in the context of political science insofar as they work to achieve 
a societal goal and thus complement or substitute the work of govern-
mental actors. This criterion, however, is not a very strict one, since many 
governments have been liberal in defining what constitutes a public 
policy issue.
In brief, ‘partnership’ is defined as a voluntary cooperative arrangement, 
involving public, private and/or civil society organisations that is formal-
ised with common, non-hierarchical decision-making procedures and that 
addresses a public policy issue.
At the global level, partnerships address a broad range of issues. The 
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles (PCFV), for example, aims at reduc-
ing air pollution caused by vehicles in developing countries. The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) regulates the techni-
cal elements of the Internet’s name and numbering systems in order to pre-
serve the operational stability of the system and promote competition. The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) aims to increase transpar-
ency and accountability to ensure that the revenues derived from extractive 
industries contribute to sustainable development and poverty reduction. The 
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN) seeks to reduce malnutrition 
of populations at risk through the fortification of staple foods and other 
strategies, and the Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C) promotes 
sustainability in the production, processing and trading of mainstream coffee 
by compiling and promoting relevant standards.
The definition employed here shares some common traits but also dis-
plays significant differences with some other definitions of partnerships 
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The Political Declaration of the WSSD in Johannesburg, which was so 
instrumental in promoting the concept of partnership by including it as 
an official, ‘type II’, outcome of the summit, contains no more than the 
following:
We recognize that sustainable development requires a long-term perspec-
tive and broad-based participation in policy formulation, decision-making 
and implementation at all levels. As social partners, we will continue to 
work for stable partnerships with all major groups, respecting the inde-
pendent, important roles of each of them.
(World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002a, § 26)
The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation that was adopted along with the 
political declaration is slightly more detailed in that it specifies the involve-
ment of ‘major groups’ in partnerships. At the same time, it constricts the 
definition to include only cooperative arrangements focusing on policy 
implementation (rather than policy definition, for example) in the area of 
sustainable development.
[T]he implementation should involve all relevant actors through partner-
ships, especially between Governments of the North and South, on the 
one hand, and between Governments and major groups, on the other, to 
achieve the widely shared goals of sustainable development. As reflected 
in the Monterrey Consensus, such partnerships are key to pursuing sus-
tainable development in a globalizing world.
(World Summit on Sustainable Development, 2002b, § 3)
This definition of partnerships and the subsequent work of the UN are, how-
ever, based on a more detailed description of criteria for partnerships. The 
criteria were developed in the run-up to WSSD and endorsed in the decision 
of the eleventh meeting of the Commission on Sustainable Development. 
Like the definition proposed here, they recognise partnerships as voluntary, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. But they only focus on initiatives designed to 
contribute to the implementation of internationally agreed development 
goals and include a range of normative criteria, such as that partnerships 
should pursue an integrated approach to sustainable development, display 
a sectoral and geographical balance and be designed in a transparent and 
accountable manner.5
The WSSD’s focus on cooperation in order to achieve a public policy goal 
is echoed in the political science literature, for example, in Börzel and Risse, 
who focus on partnerships that transcend national borders:
Transnational PPPs [public-private partnerships] would then be institution-
alized cooperative relationships between public actors (both governments 
The Concepts of Partnerships and Accountability  9
and international organizations) and private actors beyond the nation-
state for governance purposes, [i.e. for] the making and implementation 
of norms and rules for the provision of goods and services that are consid-
ered as binding by members of the international community.
(Börzel and Risse, 2005, p. 199)
By contrast, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a US government 
agency that actively encourages ‘partnering with the private sector’, sees 
partnerships as a predominantly commercial relationship and therefore 
includes only financial restrictions in its definition:
For example, a public/private partnership could be an arrangement 
whereby a contractor or third party develops and operates a system 
which is beneficial to the FDA and others and charges the cost of the 
service to users. Revenue generated by the system would be expended by 
the contractor or third party to maintain and improve the system.
(United States Food and Drug Administration, 2004, p. 1)
In a similar vein, the German government’s definition of partnerships 
focuses on co-financing mechanisms – mainly in the context of development 
policies.
We take ‘public private partnerships’ to be development partnerships with 
the private sector. Partnerships consist of projects that are co-financed by 
corporations and development agencies.
(Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2004) 
(Author’s translation)6
A comparable emphasis on the financial aspects of a partnership appears, for 
example, in Lindner and Rosenau – though they focus more on traditional 
contracting-out models, where the government plays the role of the finan-
cier that pays the private sector to provide public services, rather than the 
user-fee or co-financing models emphasised above by the governments:
[We generalise] the partnership notion to include almost any combination 
of public funding and private provision of services for public purposes.
(Linder and Rosenau, 2000, p. 7)
In some respects, then, the definition of ‘partnerships’ proposed here is 
narrower than other definitions in use (most notably with respect to the 
common decision-making criterion), while in others it is wider than at least 
some others (e.g. on the type of actors involved or the purposes pursued by 
the partnership).
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While these definitions differ from one another in various respects, they 
all belong to the same emerging discourse that places partnerships in the 
context of a public policy or governance context. As such, they have a signifi-
cantly different understanding of the term than a standard dictionary defini-
tion such as Merriam-Webster’s that defines ‘partnership’ as a legal term.
[A partnership is] a legal relation existing between two or more persons 
contractually associated as joint principals in a business, or a relationship 
resembling a legal partnership and usually involving close cooperation 
between parties having specified and joint rights and responsibilities.
(Merriam-Webster, 2004, entry for ‘partnership’)
2.1.2 Partnerships between networks and corporatism
While the term ‘partnership’ is by now much used in political practice and 
analysis, there is no extended theoretical work establishing a theory of policy 
partnerships. Networks and corporatism, by contrast, are concepts or models 
with a much longer and more refined theoretical pedigree. Both terms deal 
with modes of policymaking that include actors from the private and/or civil 
society sectors and have been applied to the study of partnerships. This sec-
tion provides a brief summary of both traditions of thought and explains the 
overlaps and differences as compared to the partnership concept used here.
2.1.2.1 Corporatism
Corporatism is a political system that provides for a legal representation of 
different industrial, economic and professional groups and their inclusion in 
political decision-making processes.7 Early proponents of corporatist political 
structures such as Adam Müller saw corporatism as a way to transform class 
conflict into class cooperation. Fascist economic theory and practice drew 
heavily on this concept, contributing to the negative associations made with 
the term today.8
Are partnerships between governmental organisations, corporations and 
civil society organisations, then, just a revival of corporatist structures under 
a new guise? This, in fact, is one of the more powerful criticisms that have 
been directed against proposed and existing partnerships.9
Some significant parallels exist between corporatism and partnerships that 
warrant a careful analysis of the arguments made and evidence collected in 
the literature about corporatism. First, corporatism, like partnerships, is about 
including organised interests in the policymaking process. As a consequence, 
the participation of individuals in the political process takes a setback in both 
arrangements – an argument that is particularly important for partnerships 
operating at the national or local level. At the same time, this means that in 
both cases the participation of groups can be regulated, thereby potentially 
minimising existing inequalities of access to people in power.
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Second, some thinkers such as John Ralston Saul have described corporat-
ism as a system in which organised elites get to influence the policy process 
at the expense of ordinary citizens.10 The same argument has been debated 
with respect to NGOs.11 For the question whether NGOs are an elite project, 
one should certainly differentiate between different types of civil society 
organisations, for example, between large and established institutions oper-
ating at an international level such as Amnesty International and small, 
community-based organisations. But when analysing partnerships between 
governmental organisations, corporations and civil society groups, one must 
bear in mind that large NGOs possess far greater visibility and resources for 
engaging in high-profile partnerships than grassroots organisations.12
Finally, both partnerships and corporatist solutions can have their most 
positive impact in policy areas rife with conflict. Addressing these conflicts 
through cooperative approaches does not only mitigate social unrest, it also 
improves compliance with the decisions taken. This aspect becomes the 
more important, the weaker the central control mechanisms of the political 
system in question are.
But there are also important differences between these two concepts. 
First, corporatist political systems normally only include labour and busi-
ness interests and focus on macroeconomic policy decisions. Partnerships 
can include these, but are rarely restricted to them. Rather, partnerships can 
cover the entire spectrum of policy issues. In each case, they will gather those 
groups that can affect the outcome and contribute to solving the problem 
addressed. Thus, for example, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was 
composed of representatives of governments interested in large dam projects, 
companies specialised in building these large projects and civil society groups 
representing those affected by the dams, who were previously often engaged 
in violent protests against the dam projects.13
Second, the groups included in corporatist governance structures tend 
to be highly centralised, with business as well as labour organisations 
representing entire sectors. Partnerships, by contrast, often include small 
 community-based organisations representing one very specific section of 
society or individual businesses whose operations have an impact on the 
goals of the partnership.
Finally, corporatism is a system that usually operates in the context of 
a national political system.14 As such, its decision-making structures ulti-
mately depend on the authority of the state. This can, but does not have to, 
lead to hierarchical decision-making procedures in corporatist institutions. 
Partnerships also work at the inter- or transnational level. While partnerships 
thus often operate ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’,15 their decision-making 
processes by definition have to be non-hierarchical. Therefore only those 
 corporatist arrangements with common and non-hierarchical decision-
 making procedures would qualify as partnerships.
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2.1.2.2 Networks
Networks are the subject of an impressive body of literature in anthropology, 
sociology, political science and economics. Naturally, these studies contain 
a broad variety of approaches, themes and focal points. When trying to 
establish how networks relate to partnerships, it is useful to distinguish three 
modes of network research: network analysis, network theories or models 
and networks as empirical phenomena.
As an analytical approach, network analysis had an early precursor in the 
sociological work of Georg Simmel16 around the turn of the last century. 
It developed into a more widespread and coherent approach in sociology 
and anthropology17 in the 1970s and has further developed since. In essence, 
network analysis is an approach to social enquiry that focuses on the interac-
tions between individuals or organisations. To understand certain dynamics 
or outcomes, it typically maps the links and exchanges between different 
actors, often using complex mathematical and statistical tools. Based on pat-
terns of interaction or the position of different actors in the network, situa-
tions can be classified.18
In political science, policy network analysis is closely associated with the 
notion of ‘governance’.19 Governance theories and approaches often take 
the diminished capability of central government to govern using traditional 
methods as their point of departure20 and focus on ways of steering by polit-
ical authorities.21 Over recent years, a vast body of literature discussing the 
concept of governance and applying network approaches to policy analysis 
has developed. Yet the cumulative insights derived from the governance 
debate seem limited and network analysis as an analytical approach has seri-
ous shortcomings.22 Moreover, a network approach is ill suited for achiev-
ing the purposes of the present enquiry, namely, to develop accountability 
standards for partnerships. Therefore, this study does not adopt a network 
approach to social analysis.
Network theory, by contrast, is mainly concerned with explaining why 
networks emerge, how they operate and what impact they have on social 
interactions. An important source of network theory is transaction cost 
analysis. It posits that firms choose that organisational form which allows 
them to minimise their transaction costs in the production and marketing 
process. Thus they can either rely on the market, on hierarchies (i.e. the 
vertical integration of suppliers) or networks of known and trusted firms to 
secure needed inputs and sell their products.23 Unfortunately, ‘network the-
ory’ does not constitute a coherent body of work24 generating a consistent 
set of assumptions and hypotheses. While some specific network theories 
may offer interesting insights relating to the emergence and operations of 
partnerships, they are unlikely to contribute much to the question of how 
accountable partnerships should be.
Finally, the term ‘network’ is used as an empirical category. Since the 
applications of network analysis and theories are extremely broad, so are the 
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descriptions of what constitutes an actual network. Delimitating the fuzzy 
notion of ‘partnership’ from the equally ill-defined notion of ‘network’ can 
therefore seem a futile task.25 Yet when concentrating on policy networks, 
two broad approaches can be distinguished. Most authors employ a broad 
definition of networks, which encompasses all non-hierarchical forms of 
linkages among actors involved in the policy process. This can range from 
entirely informal and fluid arrangements with no fixed decision-making 
procedures to highly formalised corporatist structures or intergovernmental 
policy-coordination mechanisms.26 What these arrangements have in com-
mon is that the actors are mutually dependent on each other for solving the 
problem at hand and seek to coordinate their activities to that aim.27
As represented in Figure 2.1, if this wide definition of networks is used, 
partnerships can be understood as a specific form of network. A possible 
conceptual alternative to ‘partnership’ would therefore be ‘institutionalised 
network’. But, apart from the heavy and often problematic theoretical bag-
gage referred to above, the concept of ‘network’ also has a narrow definition 
with connotations that do not fit the subject of this investigation well. Take, 
for example, Grahame Thompson’s definition of networks:
Networks have often been considered as above all ‘informal’ practices 
of coordination. They rely upon direct personal contact. They tend to 
be localized as a result, or confined to a particular clearly defined group 
with similar concerns, interests or aspirations. Such that they display a 












Figure 2.1 Partnerships, networks and corporatism
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trust rather than administrative orders or prices. […] Governance of an 
activity is achieved through the identity of a common purpose or interest, 
for which all will work for a collective result. These tend towards a ‘flat’ 
organizational structure, where at least there is a lot of formal equality 
between the participants (though there may actually be significant real 
differences of power and authority in practice).
(Thompson, 2003, pp. 30–1)
This description suggests that networks arise among actors with similar 
interests and therefore only need a low degree of institutionalisation to 
coordinate their activities. Partnerships, by contrast, often form among 
actors with strongly diverging interests. To find cooperative solutions which 
benefit all participants, clearer rules and decision-making procedures as well 
as stronger commitments by the partner organisations are required. It is due 
to these connotations of extremely loose structures, identity of interest and 
the dominance of trust and loyalty28 that the term ‘partnership’ is preferred 
here over ‘institutionalised networks’.
2.2 Accountability
As indicated in the opening pages of this book, the concept of accountability 
is highly complex. Yet accountability does have a specific core meaning. This 
section proposes a general, ‘core’ definition of accountability, clarifies the 
concept by asking the questions ‘who is accountable, to whom, for what, 
how and why?’ and explores some of the general problems and dilemmas of 
accountability.
2.2.1 Defining the ‘core’ of accountability
A standard dictionary definition of accountability reads as follows:
[Accountability is] the quality or state of being accountable; especially: an 
obligation or willingness to accept responsibility or to account for one’s 
actions.
(Merriam-Webster, 2004, entry for ‘accountability’, 
emphasis original)
That definition contains two central elements: the notion of responsibility 
and that of accounting for something. The original meaning of ‘to account’, 
in turn, is the ‘reckoning of money received and paid’ (Douglas-Harper, entry 
for ‘account’). Accounting, then, primarily refers to the keeping and trans-
mitting of information. This meaning is reflected in our understanding of 
‘accountants’, that is, professional bookkeepers. In this context ‘ accounting’ 
is neutral, in the sense that it only implies an accurate reporting of facts, not 
an evaluation of these facts.
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When we say ‘to account for’, though, the term has a different connota-
tion. According to an etymological dictionary, it was around 1700 that the 
term started to be used in the sense of ‘explaining’ and ‘answering for money 
held in trust’.29 This is where the ‘responsibility’ part of the definition stems 
from. People entrust their money to others, who accept the responsibility 
to deal with it according to the terms agreed. ‘Accounting for’, then, means 
not only transmitting accurate information about the use of that money but 
also explaining whether the money was handled as agreed.
From the perspective of an actor (often termed the ‘agent’), then, 
‘accountability’ means:
providing accurate information about one’s activities or behaviour;
evaluating that behaviour with reference to certain standards, rules or 
expectations;
thereby recognising one’s obligations and accepting responsibility for 
one’s actions.
But accountability always involves a second side, since it is a concept that 
refers to the relationship between at least two actors. In the dictionary’s 
example, the other side are the people who entrusted their money to some-
body else (often termed the ‘principal’). They are only prepared to delegate 
control over their property to an agent if they can trust that the agent will 
honour his obligations and act in their best interest. To be able to hold the 
agent accountable for doing so, the principals need sufficient information 
about the agent’s behaviour. They also need to maintain some leverage over 
the agent, that is, the ability to impose positive or negative sanctions. In a 
working accountability relationship, the principal’s ability to impose sanc-
tions and the agent’s anticipation of these sanctions are sufficient to control 
the agent’s behaviour.
From the perspective of the principal, then, accountability is a mechanism 
to ensure that the agent does not abuse his authority and acts in the best 
interest of the principal. It is at this point that the concepts of accountability 
and legitimacy intersect. Where a principal has access to sufficient account-
ability mechanisms, he is likely to regard the agent’s exercise of authority as 
legitimate. Because of this connection, many authors writing from a politi-
cal background have a habit of mentioning both terms in the same breath 
and of using them almost interchangeably.30 Yet the concepts are different 
and it is important to be aware of their distinctions.
‘Legitimacy’ is a term used in political science to designate a situation in 
which citizens accept the authority of the government and are therefore 
prepared to comply with its policies.31 In his early treatment of the subject, 
Max Weber emphasised that legitimacy can have several sources, including 
tradition and charisma, as well as the formal correctness and legality of the 
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 commonplace to acknowledge that legitimacy can derive from the use of 
appropriate inputs or processes, as well as the achievement of desirable out-
puts or results.33 In a democratic understanding of governance, appropriate 
accountability arrangements create input accountability.34 But legitimacy can 
also derive from the effectiveness or efficiency of an organisation in achiev-
ing results, which does not require a similar accountability relationship.
The basic mechanism of accountability is represented in Figure 2.2. An 
agent behaves within the context of a certain set of obligations and expec-
tations.35 Information about this behaviour can either be provided by the 
agent herself or demanded and generated by the principal. The principal 
then evaluates this information and applies positive or negative sanctions 
accordingly. Insofar as the agent can anticipate this reaction, she can adapt 
her behaviour to avoid negative sanctions.
In the previous paragraphs, I have used the terms ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ 
to designate the accountability holder and holdee respectively. The terms 
derive from principal–agent theory, an important theoretical construct in 
economics. The theory was originally designed to analyse the relationship 
between the owners and managers of companies. Over time, this reasoning 
has been applied to a wide array of situations, relaxing some of the stricter 
assumptions of the economic formulations of the theory.
In an early paper on the problems arising in principal–agent arrange-
ments, Stephen Ross defined the basic relationship as follows:
[A]n agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when 
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for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision 
problems.
(Ross, 1973, p. 134)
The theory assumes that both parties are autonomous actors and rational 
agents who want to maximise their expected utility. In most cases the princi-
pal’s utility function differs from the agent’s utility function, and that’s where 
the problem starts. The agent does not automatically act in the best interest 
of the principal. Since the activity takes place in an environment containing 
unpredictable developments which cannot be influenced by the agent, not 
all aspects of the agent’s behaviour can be predetermined in detail. In addi-
tion, the relationship involves an information asymmetry because the agent 
will always be better informed about his activities than the principal.36
Because of these three elements – diverging goals, a situation of uncer-
tainty and information asymmetry – a principal–agent relationship brings 
disadvantages to the parties involved. These so-called agency costs arise 
either from the efforts needed to make the agent act in the best interest of 
the principal or from the loss incurred if the agent’s activities diverge from 
the outcome preferred by the principal.37
To limit the negative impacts of principal–agent relationships – or, in 
other words, to improve the accountability of the agent to the principal – 
economists have focused their attention on two aspects of the relationship: 
the definition of sanctions and incentives to align the interests of agent and 
principal and the provision of information to reduce the principal’s moni-
toring costs. In a business context, solutions usually involve remuneration 
schemes for managers linking their income to company profits and strictly 
regulated and audited financial reporting mechanisms.
Economists working on principal–agent theory early on stressed the pos-
sibilities of expanding their reasoning to other social or political relations. 
Thus, Jensen and Meckling noted:
Before moving on, however, it is worthwhile to point out the generality 
of the agency problem. The problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as 
if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare is quite general. It exists 
in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts – at every level of man-
agement in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, 
in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships 
normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in 
the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of 
theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these 
situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how 
and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which 
is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally.
( Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 313)38
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Particularly political scientists focusing on democratic accountability have 
taken up this suggestion and have applied the insights derived from eco-
nomic analysis to political processes. In many cases they have also adopted 
the focus on sanctions/incentives and the provision of information. Thus 
Andreas Schedler defines political accountability as follows:
[T]he notion of political accountability carries two basic connotations: 
answerability, the obligation of public officials to inform about and to 
explain what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of account-
ing agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who have violated 
their public duties.
(Schedler, 1999, p. 14)
Similarly, Robert Keohane, who develops a concept of accountability for 
inter- and transnational politics, proposes this definition:
Accountability refers to relationships in which principals have the ability 
to demand answers from agents to questions about their proposed or past 
behavior, to discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in 
the event that they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.
(Keohane, 2002b, p. 3)
In the original formulation of principal–agent theory in economics, a num-
ber of assumptions generated a clear framework which allowed analysts to 
focus on how to strengthen accountability. Most cases are based on a con-
tract which clearly defines the principal and the agent. What the agent is 
accountable for also tends to be uncontested. It is to maximise the principal’s 
expected utility, usually defined in financial terms. Finally, while different 
types of sanctions and incentives do exist, the main focus in economic rela-
tionships is on monetary rewards or sanctions.
All of those parameters, however, have become contested and problematic. 
Within economics, stakeholder theories, for example, demand recognition 
of other stakeholder groups as principals, thus also changing what the agent 
is held accountable for.39 When applying the concepts of principal–agent 
theory to wider social or political situations, the definition of agent and 
principal changes, as well as the aspects for which the agent is accountable 
and the sanctions and incentives used to strengthen accountability.
2.2.2 Who is accountable, to whom, for what and how? 
To characterise any given accountability relationship, it is useful to begin 
by clarifying the parameters outlined above: Who is the agent? Who are the 
principal(s)? For what is the agent accountable? and How is this account-
ability created or strengthened?40 Without exploring any specific answers, 
this section sketches the general scope of these questions.
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2.2.2.1 Defining the agent
In the example used above for defining the core of accountability, an account-
ability relationship was created by one party entrusting money to another. 
If the agent that is thus created is an individual, it is obvious who can be held 
accountable for the correct use of the funds. In modern societies, though, 
many aspects of our political, economic and social lives are dominated by 
organisations. When it comes to holding organisations accountable, the 
question of who exactly is accountable can turn into a major problem.
The basic dilemma has been coined the ‘problem of many hands’ by 
Dennis Thompson. In an essay analysing responsibility in politics, he defines 
the problem as follows:
Because many different officials contribute in many ways to decisions 
and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify 
who is morally responsible for political outcomes. This is what I call the 
problem of many hands.
(Thompson, 1980, p. 905)
If a process is too complex to identify individual contributions to specific 
outcomes, then holding individuals accountable for undesirable outcomes 
becomes difficult. As a result, individuals as well as organisations as a whole 
in many instances manage to escape blame and avoid accountability.41 This 
also undermines the preventive function of accountability, encouraging 
irresponsible behaviour.
Given the far-reaching impact of organisations on modern societies, 
strategies to address the problem of who can be held accountable are very 
important. Mark Bovens, for example, distinguishes four different solutions 
to the problem, each with its own pragmatic and normative advantages and 
shortcomings.
In systems of corporate accountability, organisations as independent entities 
are treated like persons. Most legal systems recognise organisations as ‘legal 
persons’, that is, as the bearers of rights and responsibilities. This approach 
makes it easy to identify the agent and can ensure that the organisation is 
held to account for its misconduct even when the individuals originally 
responsible for these decisions are no longer present.42 Mechanisms relying 
on corporate accountability can be problematic because organisations often 
do not behave rationally (hence undermining the preventive function of 
accountability); because lack of external insight makes control difficult; 
because organisations can dissolve to escape accountability; and because 
sanctions can affect people who are not responsible for the misconduct 
(Bovens, 1998, Chapter 5).
The three remaining solutions are different varieties of holding individu-
als within organisations to account for corporate conduct. A common form 
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is hierarchical accountability. Each official in an organisation is accountable 
to his superior and the individual at the top of the organisation is held 
accountable for the behaviour of the organisation as a whole. Again, this 
model presents a very clear and easy-to-apply solution to the problem of 
many hands. Problems arise when the leaders of organisations lack adequate 
information and control over all activities of the organisation. In these 
cases, hierarchical accountability only has a limited preventive and educa-
tional effect on the organisation43 (Bovens, 1998, Chapter 6).
Another solution is collective accountability, that is, a system in which each 
individual member of a group or organisation is held to account for the 
actions of the collective. This mechanism is certainly very effective in ensur-
ing that individuals are held to account and might have a strong preventive 
effect. At the same time, most individuals identify as members of specific 
groups and might feel individually responsible for group conduct. Yet enforc-
ing sanctions to implement collective accountability clearly contradicts 
fundamental principles of the rule of law and of Western conceptions of 
morality. The application of collective form of accountability in formalised 
accountability relations is therefore very rare44 (Bovens, 1998, Chapter 7).
Finally, models of individual accountability seek to identify the exact con-
tribution of a person to an outcome and hold her accountable accordingly. 
This solution corresponds most closely to the normative principles underly-
ing democratic societies but is fully affected by the problem of many hands. 
To overcome this problem, organisations can, for example, clarify who bears 
what responsibility and improve the transparency of working processes 
(Bovens, 1998, Chapter 8).
Since each of these approaches has advantages and shortcomings, Bovens 
suggests applying a mix of accountability mechanisms depending on the 
situation. The question of who is held accountable thus remains contested. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many of the most pressing 
contemporary public policy problems are influenced by a host of different 
institutions, groups and individuals. When speaking about the problems 
that partnerships are designed to address, the problem of many hands 
therefore applies not only within organisations but also for the multitude 
of organisations involved.
2.2.2.2 Defining the principal(s)
A politically even more controversial question than who is the agent is the 
definition of the relevant principal(s). In most cases, multiple actors are 
recognised or are struggling to be recognised as principals. In businesses, for 
example, shareholders are broadly accepted as having the right to hold man-
agement to account, but in many cases we also see customers, employees and 
suppliers making accountability claims. Similarly, leading public officials in 
democracies are accountable to parliament as well as to independent financial 
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agencies controlling the use of public funds and to the general public via the 
media.
The existence of multiple principals raises two problems. Firstly, as we 
have seen above when defining agency costs, monitoring the agent is costly 
for the principal. If multiple or fragmented principals exist,45 a collective 
action problem arises since no single actor has an incentive to bear the costs 
of providing information that could be used by all principals to monitor the 
activities of the agent.46
The second, more intractable problem lies in the fact that different prin-
cipals have different, potentially conflicting criteria for judging the agent’s 
conduct. Thus shareholders hold managers accountable for high returns on 
investment, employees for high salaries, good working conditions and job 
security, while customers emphasise low prices and high product quality.47 
Similarly, public officials are held to account for producing outcomes by the 
media and public, while financial oversight committees demand account-
ability for the correct use of funds.48
Agents can use the existence of multiple principals to avoid account-
ability.49 But they can also accept the complex task of assigning priorities 
among principals and balancing their various claims. R. Edward Freeman in 
his argument to adopt a stakeholder theory of the firm – which is no other 
than to recognise other stakeholders as co-principals on an equal footing as 
shareholders – described the scope of the challenge confronting managers:
The task of management in today’s corporation is akin to that of King 
Solomon […] management must keep the relationships among stake-
holders in balance.
(Freeman, 2001, p. 44)
All partnerships face a range of different principals. Depending on the for-
mality of their accountability claims, we can generally distinguish three lev-
els of accountability holders: legal and fiscal authorities, formal principals 
and informal principals. The different layers are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Legal and fiscal authorities: The level of accountability with the strictest and 
most formalised definition of both obligations for agents and sanctions in 
case of their violation is to legal and fiscal authorities.
In the debate about institutions that act at the transnational or interna-
tional level, legal and fiscal accountability is often neglected, because there 
is no all-encompassing international legal code or court system. Yet almost 
all institutions are located and operate on national territories and are thereby 
bound by their respective rules and regulations.50 Multinational corporations, 
for example, despite their power have to abide by the rules of the countries 
they operate in. Integrated international markets and financial systems do, 
however, allow them to choose which national regulatory and enforcement 
system they want to be subject to. This can put corporations in a strong posi-
tion when they lobby for changes in national rule systems.
Formal principals: The next level of accountability is that defined by con-
tracts or other means of formal delegation. In these cases, contracts, statutes 
or briefs establish who transfers what authority to whom. Thus they clearly 
define the identity of both principal and agent, as well as the obligations of 
the agent and sanctions that apply in case of non-compliance. As a result, 
formal accountability relationships tend to be uncontested in principle. 
Disputes may arise over the details of honouring obligations or the appli-
cation of sanctions but not the existence of an accountability relationship 
itself. Examples for such principal–agent situations include the relationship 
between company owners and managers, between elected governments and 
their ministers as well as their delegations in international organisations and 
between civil society organisations and their members or donors.
Informal principals: A third level of accountability is based on the informal, 
implicit or hypothetical delegation of authority. As argued in greater detail 
in section 3.2.3, organisations often assume authority without explicit prior 
authorisation. In these cases, those who originally or rightfully hold the 
authority now exercised by the organisation have a claim to accountability. 
The lack of formality means, however, that these claims are often contested.
In practice, the relative power of groups or individuals often determines 
whether they can hold an agent accountable. Establishing clear criteria for 
determining who should be recognised as a principal is nevertheless impor-
tant, not least because legitimacy itself has become a currency of power in 
a globalised world.
2.2.2.3 What are agents accountable for?
Accountability was defined above in the context of a principal–agent 
 relationship. This makes it easy to define what an agent is accountable for in 
abstract terms. Agents are accountable for using the authority given to them 
in a way that fulfils the principal’s expectations. When somebody entrusts 
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the management of resources to somebody else, for example, she probably 
expects the agent to use those resources efficiently and effectively to achieve 
the agreed goal.
But principal–agent relationships can take on very different forms. In addi-
tion, any single agent can be subject to the accountability demands of a vari-
ety of principals. It is therefore impossible to describe all the possible aspects 
an agent can be held to account for in concrete terms. Generally speaking, 
though, agents are held accountable for the way they handle resources, for their 
compliance with rules and procedures and for the outcomes they  produce.
Accountability for finances: Financial accountability could be subsumed under 
the other two headings relating to processes and outcomes, but it deserves 
to be treated separately because it is so central both to our understanding of 
accountability51 and to the workings of organisations.
Agents can be held accountable for three different aspects of the way they 
handle resources. Firstly, it can concern the sources of an agent’s financial and 
other means. Whoever provides an organisation with resources gains influ-
ence over it. This can make the agent dependent and corrupt its impartiality. 
Public agencies, many civil society organisations and institutions involved in 
evaluation and monitoring are thus often held accountable for the sources of 
their funds.52
Secondly, agents are accountable for using their resources efficiently and 
effectively. Those who provide an organisation with resources usually want 
to ensure the agent uses them in the best way for reaching the desired goals. 
In the private sector, return on investment is a common measure for estab-
lishing whether resources were well used. In the public and civil society sec-
tors, similar measures are usually more difficult to find.
Thirdly, the way an agent handles resources can be under scrutiny. Because 
efficiency and effectiveness are often hard to measure in public agencies and 
civil society organisations, more weight tends to be attached to the rules and 
processes for managing resources. Thus donors and public agencies often pre-
determine in great detail which resources can be allocated for what purpose 
and agents are held accountable for following those rules. The key to proper 
financial management – professional bookkeeping and accounting, combined 
with adequate reporting – though, is expected of organisations in all three 
sectors.
Accountability for finances can create considerable conflicts and  dilemmas. 
Firstly, different principals often have different views on what resources 
should be spent on. Company managers, for example, can be pressured by 
shareholders to deliver maximum dividends. Employees may favour higher 
wages; consumers usually opt for lower prices and NGOs lobby for a greater 
share of resources to be invested, for example, in environmental protection.
Secondly, the three aspects of financial accountability are not necessar-
ily compatible. An environmental NGO that rejects contributions from oil 
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 companies to maintain its independence, for example, may be unable to 
reach its goals because of a lack of resources. Similarly, professional and accu-
rate accounting and reporting is costly and can divert resources away from 
other purposes. And strict and detailed rules on how to handle resources can 
curtail the flexibility of agents to such an extent that their efficiency suffers. 
As further discussed in section 2.3, organisations must therefore carefully 
determine which aspects of accountability they want to stress.
Accountability for compliance with rules and processes: Another general aspect 
that agents are held accountable for is their compliance with rules and 
procedures. Rules and predefined procedures serve to control the behaviour 
of agents. They can do so by directly protecting the interests of others. 
Companies, for example, in many countries have to pay their employees 
minimum wages and are restricted in their rights to fire them. Other rules 
and processes are components of accountability mechanisms. They make it 
easier for principals to enforce their accountability claims. An example of 
this is the right of workers to unionise or to participate in the management 
of the company. Principals are often interested in enforcing compliance 
with these rules and processes because it allows them to create effective 
accountability for their other interests.
The rules and processes regulating the behaviour of agents can be defined 
by governmental authorities in laws, regulations and fiscal rules. But they 
can also be determined by principals. When a new agency is created, for 
example, the founding institutions create a statute and by-laws determining 
the agency’s mandate and governance. Common types of rules and processes 
that agents are expected to follow include:
Legal and fiscal rules: The rules and processes prescribed for organisations 
are complex and vary between countries as well as between different 
organisational forms. They pertain, for example, to the requirements for 
registration or incorporation, the treatment of employees or competitive 
practices. Compliance with these rules can be enforced by national judi-
cial systems. Where judicial systems work well, accountability for compli-
ance with legal and fiscal rules is therefore high.
Decision-making procedures: Another important set of rules and pre-
scribed procedures covers the way organisations make decisions. This 
includes regulations on which body can take which decisions by what 
decision rule, as well as who needs to be included or consulted and who 
is bound by the decision. Decision rules can be important mechanisms to 
strengthen accountability. They help determine who bears what responsi-
bility for a certain outcome and allow those principals who are included 
in the process to articulate their preferences directly. Irrespective of the 
outcome of a decision, principals therefore often hold agents accountable 
for following the correct procedures when taking decisions.
•
•
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Which decision-making procedures are set for an organisation is highly 
dependent on context. The requirements are often stricter for the public 
than the private sector and more demanding for taking strategic deci-
sions than for implementing them. A standard that all types of organisa-
tions can be held accountable for is due diligence.53 Principals demand 
due diligence from managers and bankers in investment decisions. But 
the public also holds public agencies and NGOs accountable for ‘not 
doing their homework properly’. Thus Greenpeace, after the Brent Spar 
campaign, as well as the Bush administration in the follow-up to the 
invasion of Iraq experienced a sharp drop in public support.54
Transparency: A final crucial set of rules and regulations determines what 
information an organisation has to provide to whom. As we have seen in 
the definition of accountability above, access to reliable and useful 
information is essential to any accountability mechanism. Transparency 
requirements therefore figure prominently in the rules and procedures 
laid down for organisations55 and principals are often keen to enforce 
compliance with these rules. The rules regulate not only what needs to 
be communicated but also determine requirements for the quality of 
information. Many organisations, for example, are obliged to conform to 
strict standards in their accounting and reporting, and must have their 
accounts and activities verified by independent auditors.56
Accountability for results: Perhaps the most obvious aspect that organisa-
tions are held to account for are the outcomes or results of their work. This 
includes firstly which goals an organisation pursues. Take, for example, an 
advocacy NGO that claims to represent the interests of indigenous people 
and seeks to stop the construction of a dam on their behalf. The group of 
indigenous people may actually disagree and try to hold the NGO account-
able for its goals. Similarly, citizens hold governments accountable for the 
goals they pursue by endorsing or rejecting proposed policies in elections.
Secondly, accountability for results can refer to the way in which an organ-
isation achieves its aims. The main question here is whether the organisation 
is efficient in its operations. Consumers, for example, can hold companies 
accountable for efficiency by choosing products that, at similar quality, are 
offered at a cheaper price. Comparison is more difficult in the public and 
civil society sectors. But donors, for example, increasingly use measures like 
the ratio of overhead costs to total budget as shorthand for efficiency.
Finally, principals can focus on the quality of results. Is the organisation 
effective and successful in reaching the goals it set for itself? A government that 
was voted in on the promise to reduce unemployment, for example, may lose 
subsequent elections if it fails to deliver effective results. Similarly, a research 
institution can quickly lose its reputation as well as funding if its results fail to 
live up to scientific standards, just as a professional auditor will find himself in 
court and out of business if his results are not accurate and impartial.
•
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In practice, creating accountability for the efficiency and quality of results is 
often difficult. The chief reason for this is that some outcomes are much easier 
to evaluate than others. Thus, it is much easier to judge the financial returns 
of an investment than to measure the social or environmental effects of an 
investment decision, policy or civil society campaign. As a result, accountabil-
ity for easy-to-measure results often takes precedence over accountability for 
more fuzzy kinds of results, or accountability for easily evaluated procedural 
aspects dominate outcome accountability. As Robert Behn argued persuasively 
for accountability in the political sector, this can lead to serious shortcomings 
in the overall workings of a political system (Behn, 2001).
2.2.2.4 How is accountability created or strengthened?
The definition of accountability proposed above contained a description 
of the basic mechanism through which accountability works. An agent 
behaves in a certain way. Information about these activities is used by 
the principal to evaluate the agent’s behaviour. Depending on whether or 
not the behaviour conforms to the principal’s expectations, she will apply 
sanctions to control the agent’s activities, thus establishing what could be 
termed ‘retroactive accountability’. If the agent can anticipate this reac-
tion, the expectation of sanctions influences his actions, hence generating 
‘ proactive’ or ‘preventive accountability’.57
Accountability can go wrong at each of these four steps: Firstly, the effects 
of the agent’s behaviour can be unclear.58 Secondly, the information available 
to the principal can be biased or insufficient for an appropriate evaluation. 
Thirdly, accountability can fail if the expectations of the principal or princi-
pals are unclear or contradictory. Finally, the principal might not possess suf-
ficient means for sanctioning the agent or his threat to use those sanctions 
may not be credible enough to preventively change the agent’s behaviour.
Mechanisms to create or strengthen accountability, then, are measures that 
address any of these issues.59 Since an accountability system is only as strong 
as its weakest point,60 effective accountability strategies address all four areas 
at the same time, or focus on the area with the greatest shortcomings.
Clarifying the agent’s contributions and responsibilities: There are two situations 
in which the effects of an agent’s behaviour are unclear: Firstly, the activities 
and responsibilities of an actor may be well known, but the consequences of 
these actions are not. Many environmental problems, for example, are caus-
ally extremely complex and scientifically disputed. Apart from improving the 
scientific evidence relating to the problem, accountability can be improved 
if very specific behavioural goals are defined based on existing evidence. 
This happened, for example, in the area of climate change, where the Kyoto 
Protocol defined specific targets for the reduction of CO2 emissions. These 
are now used to either make companies reduce their emissions or pay for 
additional emission rights.
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Secondly, this lack of clarity can occur when the agent’s responsibilities 
are unclear. The obvious remedy here is to assign responsibilities and tasks 
more clearly. While the agents must retain flexibility to react to unexpected 
developments, a clearly defined mandate is important to establish account-
ability within an organisation, and also when different groups or institutions 
cooperate to reach a joint goal.
Improving the provision of information: As we have seen above, information 
asymmetry is one of the major drivers of agency costs. Correspondingly, 
transparency, or the availability of correct and useful information, is a cen-
tral precondition for accountability.61 The issues relating to transparency 
include the scope, source, quality, credibility, formats and associated costs 
of information:
Generally, principals want information on anything they hold the agent 
accountable for. This can refer to an organisation’s finances, its operating 
procedures and internal governance, as well as the outcomes produced in 
different areas. The challenge for any organisation is to find the right bal-
ance between the necessary scope and degree of detail in reports and their 
usability. In addition, certain aspects of an organisation’s work might be 
subject to legitimate confidentiality requirements, such as, for example, the 
takeover plans of a company.
Information can be generated by both the agent and the principal. In both 
cases, the quality of information is crucial and different types of reporting 
and auditing standards are used to guarantee quality. When it is the agent 
who makes information available, he often encounters credibility problems. 
These are most commonly addressed through external verification.62 When 
the principal generates the necessary information, credibility can also be 
an issue (e.g. Greenpeace’s Brent Spar episode), but in addition, the question 
of how sources of information are protected and how the agent deals with 
information requests are salient.63
Another important aspect concerns the format in which information is 
transmitted. To be useful, the format must fit the needs of the respective 
audience. Thus while publications of English language annual reports on 
the Internet might be appropriate for satisfying the information needs of 
Western NGOs, they might not be accessible to local communities in the 
developing world. Here, signs, billboards or public discussions in the local 
language might be necessary to convey information effectively.
Finally, the costs of providing and using information have to be considered. 
Providing detailed reports and evaluations of an organisation’s activities can 
be highly complex and requires specialised skills and staff time. From the 
perspective of an agent, bearing this cost is only worthwhile if it serves to 
avert sanctions. For principals, particularly when they are fragmented, gen-
erating information can lead to a collective action problem. Stock markets 
have solved this problem by specifying disclosure requirements for listed 
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 companies and by employing rating agencies to provide additional informa-
tion and evaluate available data.
Clarifying the principal’s expectations: To create a strong accountability rela-
tionship it is also crucial that the principal’s expectations be clearly defined 
and articulated. Clearly defined and, where possible, operationalised expec-
tations form the basis for evaluating the agent’s behaviour.
In many cases, the expectations and demands of a principal are ill defined. 
This can be the case in situations involving formal delegation. Even where a 
contract defines the principal–agent relationship, the tasks and achievements 
expected of the agent can be too broad to provide any practical guidance.64 
But a lack in clarity is even more frequent in informal accountability rela-
tionships such as between consumers and producers or civil society groups 
and political institutions. Here, expectations are often not articulated at all 
or are unclear and subject to change.
When the principal is a fragmented and dispersed group of individuals 
or organisations, formulating precise expectations presents a formidable 
challenge that might require the installation of a centralised spokesperson. 
The task is easier when the principal is an individual or a coherent group or 
institution. Here, the scope for improvement is often large, particularly in 
the political sphere. Yet a fundamental tension will always remain between 
the desire to define precise steps and responsibilities in a mandate and 
leaving the agent with a sufficient degree of freedom to react to unforeseen 
developments.65
The case becomes even more complex when different principals with 
diverging interests and expectations exist. As Robert Keohane pointed 
out, this can be abused by agents to avoid accountability.66 The flipside 
of this coin is that those agents who do not want to escape accountability 
and are confronted with multiple, conflicting expectations can find it 
impossible to do justice to all principals.67 Despite their best intentions, 
they can be subject to sanctions from various sides. To avoid sanctions, 
the agent can create transparency about which expectations exist and 
how she balances or prioritises them, hoping for understanding and 
approval from the principals. Alternatively, she can attempt to make 
the principals (or at least some of them) to agree on a coherent set of 
objectives among themselves. Companies conducting multi-stakeholder 
dialogues, for example, can use this forum for either of the two strate-
gies of explaining and creating transparency or developing a consensus 
among stakeholders.
Strengthening sanctions and incentives: The ability to impose negative or posi-
tive sanctions is the ultimate means through which principals control the 
agent’s behaviour. The types of sanctions available to different groups or 
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individuals vary considerably in their nature and their salience to the agent. 
They include:68
Legal and fiscal sanctions: Organisations, even if they work on a transna-
tional or international level, are bound by the laws and regulations of the 
country they operate in. Legal and fiscal systems around the world define 
very explicit rules for the behaviour of individuals and corporate actors, as 
well as the sanctions to be applied in case of their breach. Both the con-
tent of these rules and sanctions and the degree of their enforcement vary 
significantly between countries. Well-functioning legal and fiscal systems 
can impose tough sanctions and can therefore be very effective in creat-
ing accountability. This accountability, though, is usually limited in scope, 
sanctioning only outright transgressions of norms.
Elections: In democratic political systems, elections are commonly used as 
sanctions to ensure the political leadership respects the preferences of the 
people.69 Elections are also used within many organisations or cooperative 
bodies to make elected officials accountable to their electorate.
Disciplinary measures: In hierarchical organisations, superiors can usually 
resort to disciplinary measures for holding their staff to account for their 
actions. These can be quasi-legal (as is the case in military organisations) 
or result in pay-cuts, changes in the job description or dismissal.
Financial incentives: While legal sanctions, elections and disciplinary 
measures have a strong impact on agents, financial incentives and sanc-
tions can be more easily fine-tuned and thus allow for a more differenti-
ated form of accountability. Financial sanctions are used to hold both 
individuals and organisations to account. Thus managers’ salaries are 
often linked to the company’s performance, consumers and investors can 
exert pressure through their market decisions and donors often link their 
contributions to specific demands.
Withdrawal and voluntary compliance: A potent sanctioning mechanism 
for those who might not have formal or financial means to influence an 
organisation or process is the option to stop participating in it70 or fail to 
comply with its resolutions. To be effective, the actor who denies participa-
tion or compliance must be critical to the issue at hand. Thus, for example, 
the refusal of the US to participate in international agreements like the 
Kyoto Protocol seriously affects its effectiveness. Similarly, the quantity of 
individuals leaving the GDR prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall seriously 
undermined the state’s legitimacy. In the corporate sector, the operations of 
a company can be threatened if many employees quit their jobs or lay down 
their work in strikes. At the international level, where no centralised enforce-
ment mechanism exists, the necessity to achieve voluntary compliance with 
norms and resolutions is one of the key levers for groups demanding the 
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Reputation: A more subtle and diffuse type of sanction relates to an individ-
ual’s or an organisation’s reputation. The opinions held by relevant groups 
about an organisation or individual matter since they influence their ability 
to operate. Reputation affects, among others, who want to work for, engage 
with or vote for the actor and how seriously products or ideas are taken.71
Protest and violence: Finally, all those who feel they do not possess suf-
ficient alternative sanctions to hold an agent accountable can resort to 
protests or even violence to make their claims heard. From the so-called 
Monday demonstrations against labour market reforms in Germany, via 
the street protests against the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) policies 
in Seattle to acts of sabotage and violence against oil firms operating in 
the Nigerian Delta region, it is particularly those who feel excluded and 
marginalised who resort to protests and violence to create accountability.
With such a broad array of potential sanctions available, two main strategies 
exist to strengthen accountability based on sanctions. Firstly, institutional 
structures can be changed to give specific principals access to new kinds 
of sanctions. This can mean the creation of entities organising collective 
action to increase the sanctioning potential, such as trade unions or NGOs 
giving voice to marginalised groups. Or it can mean the inclusion of groups 
in decision-making processes, as is the case when corporations conduct 
multi-stakeholder dialogues or when the UN grants NGOs official status in 
its negotiations.72 The latter process is often an attempt to change available 
sanctioning mechanisms from those that work crudely and ex-post facto like 
protests and violence to more differentiated ones that are better suited to 
creating proactive or preventive accountability such as elections or partici-
pation in decision-making processes.
Secondly, the accountability effect of existing sanctions can be strength-
ened by improving their enforcement. Better enforcement not only allows 
stronger retroactive accountability but thereby also makes the threat of 
sanctions more credible, thus enhancing preventive accountability. One 
way to make the enforcement of sanctions more reliable is the creation or 
strengthening of enforcement institutions, such as state prosecution offices, 
disciplinary committees in institutions or control and evaluation units in 
donor organisations. Another way is to make sanctions more immediate and 
link them more directly to the agent’s behaviour. Thus, for example, manag-
ers’ salaries are now often directly tied to company performance. This means 
that sanctions and rewards are triggered automatically.
2.2.2.5 When is the agent interested in strengthening accountability?
We have now seen how accountability can be created or strengthened at each 
of the four steps involved in the basic accountability mechanism. Measures 
to improve accountability can be taken by both sides, the principal(s) and 
the agent. While it seems obvious why principals want to create strong 
•
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accountability (namely to align the agent’s behaviour as much as possible 
with their own interests and goals), it might not be so clear why an agent 
might be interested in strengthening his own accountability.
Indeed, Keohane suggests that ‘Opportunistic agents will seek to design 
institutional arrangements that only nominally control their behavior’ 
(Keohane, 2002b, p. 14). Similarly, Robert Behn argues that agents have a very 
clear view on accountability which does not make it sound like a desirable 
outcome: ‘Those whom we want to hold accountable have a clear understand-
ing of what accountability means: accountability means punishment’ (Behn, 
2001, p. 3).
Yet there are clear instances in which agents do take measures to make 
themselves more accountable. Of course, these actions can be taken in 
response to or anticipation of pressure for reform. But it can also be in the 
agent’s interest to actively push for improved accountability. Jensen describes 
this in his early definition of agency costs:
In addition in situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding 
costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm 
the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does 
take such actions.
( Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 5, emphasis original)
Figure 2.4 illustrates the motivation of principal and agent in creating or 
strengthening accountability.73 The situation is presented as a simple game 
involving two steps. Agent A can either pursue his own or the principal’s 
 interest. Principal P can either apply sanctions to A or not. The payoff struc-
ture (payoff A, payoff P) shows that the optimal outcome from the perspec-
tive of the agent is ‘pursue A’s interests’ and ‘no sanction’. The principal, 
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by contrast, has a strong preference for the agent to pursue P’s interests. 
Therefore, the principal has an interest in making the threat of sanctions cred-
ible enough to induce A to choose ‘pursue P’s interests’.
From the perspective of the agent, the situation is slightly more complex. 
His first instinct is probably to try to weaken accountability so that he can 
pursue his own interests without incurring any sanctions. Two considera-
tions, however, can change this calculus. Firstly, the principal is probably 
only willing to engage in this game at all or to play it again if she sees a rea-
sonable chance that the agent will pursue P’s interests. As long as the agent 
derives a greater benefit from playing than from not playing, he has an inter-
est in making a credible commitment not to abuse his authority, that is, in 
strengthening accountability.74 Secondly, the agent also has a strong motiva-
tion to avoid a situation where he does his best to act in the principal’s inter-
ests, but gets sanctioned nevertheless. He can reduce this risk by demanding 
that the principal clearly articulates her expectations and preferences and by 
ensuring that the principal receives adequate information about the agent’s 
behaviour. In this sense, too, the agent can be interested in strengthening the 
accountability relationship.
2.2.3 The accountability dilemma
The term ‘accountability’ carries overwhelmingly positive connotations. 
Many therefore assume that it is simply a case of ‘the more, the better’.75 
This is particularly the case in the international sphere, where researchers 
and activists now increasingly come to see mechanisms to strengthen the 
accountability of different organisations as a means to balance the demo-
cratic deficit of global institutions.76
While accountability does play an important role in making the opera-
tions and policies of influential actors more responsive to the needs and 
interests of those affected, it is not always a case of ‘the more, the better’. In 
Mark Boven’s words, ‘Public accountability may be a good thing, but we can 
certainly have too much of it’ (Bovens, 2005, p. 194).
Accountability relationships can have negative impacts in three main 
respects. Firstly, principals can hold agents accountable according to multi-
ple, sometimes even contradictory standards. Where this is the case, account-
ability demands can have a paralysing effect on organisations. In addition, 
even well-intentioned agents will find it impossible to fulfil all expectations 
at once and face undeserved sanctions. Jonathan Koppell has described 
organisations trying to satisfy various conflicting accountability demands 
as suffering from a ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ (MAD). In his experi-
ence, such situations are likely to undermine the overall accountability of an 
organisation: ‘Rather than satisfying all conceptions of accountability, the 
MAD-afflicted organization often satisfies none’ (Koppell, 2005, p. 99).
Secondly, accountability mechanisms generate costs. Creating transpar-
ency and monitoring activities, for example, requires substantial efforts on 
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the part of the principal as well as the agent. Where sanctions are imposed, 
they further reduce the benefits of at least one of the sides involved.
Thirdly, excessive accountability can hamper flexibility and innovation. 
When accountability means strict control, this constricts the agent’s flex-
ibility and ability to react to events and new developments. This means that 
the agent may not be able to act and to use resources as efficiently as he 
otherwise could. In addition, the threat of strong sanctions may lead many 
agents to act more cautiously and avoid taking risks. Risk taking, however, 
is essential for developing innovative solutions to problems.
Accountability can thus involve both benefits and negative conse-
quences.77 In the literature, opinions about the overall effect of account-
ability on performance diverge. First, there is a range of authors who see a 
positive effect. Thus, for example, Melvin Dubnick quotes numerous sources 
and describes the ‘promise of performance’ as follows:
According to proponents of accountability-centered reforms, enhanced 
accountability will (among other things) result in […] improvements in 
the quality of government services. 
(Dubnick, 2003, p. 1)
This view is contradicted by those who see a conflict between accountability 
and performance. Peter Self described this dilemma as a central one:
[T]he tensions between the requirements of responsibility or ‘accounta-
bility’ and those of effective executive action can reasonably be described 
as the classic dilemma of public administration.
(Quoted in Behn, 2001, p. 11)
Alnoor Ebrahim makes a similar claim for non-profit organisations (NPOs). 
He contends that
for NPOs and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in activi-
ties of complex social development and poverty alleviation, too much 
accountability can hinder them in achieving their missions.
(Ebrahim, 2005, p. 56)
This last quote already indicates that authors searching for an answer to the 
question of whether accountability enhances or hinders performance that is 
valid across the board may be misguided. Many researchers reject the assump-
tion that accountability has either necessarily positive or always negative 
consequences. Aucoin and Heintzman, for example, argue that
[p]itting accountability against performance does not, in our view, address 
the issue in the most constructive manner. […] Improving accountability 
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arrangements does not necessarily improve performance, but the 
 proposition that there can be improved performance in the absence of 
improved accountability is a proposition that cannot be sustained.
(Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000, p. 54)
Similarly, Melvin Dubnick comes to the conclusion that
we cannot and should not continue to rely on the assumed relationship 
between accountability and performance [namely, that accountability 
improves performance].
(Dubnick, 2003, p. 40)
Rather than trying to solve the question of whether or not accountability 
enhances performance once and for all, researchers should therefore concen-
trate on determining under which circumstances which types of account-
ability have an overall positive effect on the situation. Robert Behn’s book 
Rethinking Democratic Accountability is a good example for such an approach. 
He develops detailed proposals for shifting accountability in public adminis-
tration from accountability for finances and fairness to more accountability 
for performance (Behn, 2001). This book hopes to make a contribution in 
a similar vein. It develops an abstract framework for defining what type of 
accountability is appropriate for which kind of organisation and develops 
concrete standards indicating which groups of partnerships should adopt 
which accountability measures.
2.3 Partnership accountability
Partnerships as cooperative governance mechanisms and the concepts and 
practices of accountability each on their own raise sufficient research puzzles 
to fill volumes. What is it, then, that makes accountability important for 
partnerships and why do partnerships create particularly challenging ques-
tions for accountability?
This section focuses on the special nature of partnership accountability in 
terms of the salience of accountability to partnerships, the specific acuteness 
of accountability trade-offs and the distinctive complexity of developing 
accountability concepts and mechanisms for partnerships.
2.3.1 Political salience
Accountability is important for any organisation that influences the lives of 
individuals. Yet in the debate about partnerships involving actors from the 
public, corporate and civil society sectors, the issue is particularly salient. 
As argued in the introduction to this book, most principled objections 
against partnerships are based on concerns about accountability.
Fears run deep that we cannot hold to account remote powers whose 
actions have far-reaching impacts on our lives. This is especially the case in 
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societies accustomed to liberal-democratic political arrangements, which at 
least theoretically grant their citizens extensive controls over government 
operations. Take for instance the intense debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ 
of the European Union. It shows how sensitively people react when their 
governments surrender authority to less directly accountable institutions.78 
By agreeing to common decision-making procedures, partners also delegate 
some authority to partnerships. This stretches the accountability links to the 
partners’ original accountability holders and thus weakens their control over 
outcomes. If the partnership does not have appropriate accountability mecha-
nisms in place to compensate for this accountability loss, a political backlash 
against its activities can be expected.
At the same time, partnerships are often created to address accountabil-
ity problems of the partner organisations. The focus here is less the abso-
lute level of accountability than to whom organisations are accountable. 
Reformers often demand greater inclusiveness and accountability to various 
stakeholder groups from government, international organisations and corpo-
rations. Partnerships are one avenue for achieving just this. By giving impor-
tant stakeholder groups a say in decisions, partnerships can create more 
accountability.79 Partnerships thus present challenges to established forms of 
accountability, yet promise more accountability to new principals.
Beyond that, reflections about partnership accountability have a special 
relevance now because most partnerships are still relatively young, in par-
ticular those launched during or in the aftermath of the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development. It is now that standards for their internal gov-
ernance structures, reporting requirements, transparency and other account-
ability mechanisms are being defined – yet most actors are still lacking the 
necessary experience with partnerships to take informed decisions on these 
issues.
If we take other institutional developments as an indicator, we can observe 
that accountability systems are typically reformed or strengthened after 
they failed, that is, in response to disasters and scandals. Thus the scandals 
that led to the resignation of the European Commission (EC) under Jacques 
Santer triggered important reforms concerning the transparency of EC pro-
cedures and the powers of control of the European Parliament.80 Similarly, 
the mismanagement and accounting problems leading to the spectacular col-
lapse of numerous companies like Enron encouraged corporate governance 
reforms in the US.81 While these changes will hopefully help prevent similar 
problems in the future, the damage in terms of losses of financial resources 
and trust was done.
Research leading to a better understanding of the types, mechanisms, 
trade-offs and minimum requirements of partnership accountability could 
contribute to the preventive installation of adequate accountability mecha-
nisms. This would give partnerships the chance to develop good governance 
structures without experiencing disastrous failures.
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2.3.2 Importance of trade-offs
As discussed above, accountability can be strengthened by addressing the clar-
ity of the agent’s responsibilities, the flow of information, the clarity of the 
principal’s expectations and criteria for evaluation or the availability of sanc-
tions. Each element in the accountability chain, though, has its downside:
Very clearly demarcated responsibilities of individual actors make it more 
difficult to adapt to changed circumstances and might prevent these 
actors from focusing on the big picture;
providing information that is timely, accurate and fits the needs of differ-
ent principals is labour-intense and creates substantial costs, thus divert-
ing resources away from other uses;
operationalising principals’ expectations is fraught with difficulties and 
can deflect attention away from broader goals and defining common 
expectations of different principals can be a lengthy, if not impossible, 
process;
strong sanctions diminish the readiness to assume risks, while giving 
many stakeholders access to new sanctions by including them can make 
decision-making processes very cumbersome.
The arguments mentioned so far apply to all actors that are accountable 
to someone. But just as the issue of accountability is especially relevant for 
partnerships, so are the trade-offs. Firstly, partnerships in many cases are not 
strongly institutionalised. Designed at least in part as an alternative to overly 
bureaucratised and inefficient traditional institutions, partnerships are a par-
ticularly valuable tool of governance when they remain flexible. This means 
that the risk of losing the ability to adapt quickly to new developments is 
especially high for partnerships.
Secondly, the provision of timely, relevant and accurate information 
presents bigger problems to new than to established institutions. When insti-
tutions are in the early stages of their development, they typically have few 
staff members and very constrained resources. That makes it difficult to spare 
the necessary time and money for providing information. In addition, young 
institutions change at a faster pace than old ones, making it more difficult to 
keep information up to date. Since the fashion of cross-sector partnerships is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, most partnerships are still young, making 
the costs of providing information relatively high.82
The third point relates to the difficulties that arise when different princi-
pals pursue diverging goals. The interests of different accountability holders 
rarely converge. Yet for most other types of institutions it is possible to priori-
tise these interests depending on the strength of the sanctions the principals 
have at their disposal.83 Partnerships by definition include actors from the 
public sector, businesses and/or civil society as partners. This means that 
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layer of accountability holders and enjoy roughly equal status. Problems of 
conflicting goals can therefore not be solved by prioritising one principal’s 
issues over the others. Partnerships either have to resolve the conflict by rec-
onciling interests and finding compromises – often a long and burdensome 
process – or ignore it at the risk of making meaningful partnership activities 
impossible.
Finally, sanctions work most effectively if they work preventively. For an 
agent to be able to adapt his behaviour preventively, he must be in a posi-
tion to anticipate under what conditions which sanctions will be applied. 
This is unproblematic where a partnership explicitly defines these sanctions 
(e.g. by linking the salaries of partnership managers to performance or by 
deciding that the executive board has to be regularly approved through elec-
tions). For many other issues, however, expectations are shaped by different 
corporate or national cultures. Thus both the rules and the likelihood of their 
enforcement can vary significantly between national legal systems as well as 
between partner organisations. This can result in a lack of clarity about sanc-
tions and thereby undermine their effectiveness as means of prevention.
2.3.3 Complexity
Finally, as argued in the Introduction, defining concepts and effective mech-
anisms of accountability is even more complex for partnerships than for 
more traditional institutions. This complexity – together with the salience 
of the topic and the enhanced relevance of trade-offs – makes it important 
to arrive at a clear empirical, analytical and normative understanding of 
partnership accountability.
More specifically, the complexity stems from two major factors. Firstly, 
partnerships engage in a broad variety of activities, ranging from advocacy 
and awareness raising, generating information and verifying compliance, 
setting norms and standards to funding or coordinating policy implementa-
tion. As will be argued in Chapter 3, partnerships ought to embrace different 
accountability arrangements depending on what functions they exercise. 
Between the various partnership types, there are significant, albeit inconsist-
ent, variations in accountability.
Secondly, understanding and evaluating partnership accountability is 
complex because accountability concepts and mechanisms have so far been 
developed mostly for traditional institutions. The accountability traditions 
of democratic governments, international organisations, corporations and 
civil society organisations differ significantly.84 Since partnerships include 
actors from and perform the functions of several of these organisations, we 
need to define standards for partnerships that take these differences into 
account. This will be the subject of the normative inquiry in the following 
chapters.
